Cloud DBs offer strong properties, including serializability, sometimes called the gold standard database correctness property. But cloud DBs are complicated black boxes, running in a different administrative domain from their clients; thus, clients might like to know whether the DBs are meeting their contract. A core difficulty is that the underlying problem here, namely verifying serializability, is NP-complete [93] . Nevertheless, we hypothesize that on real-world workloads, verifying serializability is tractable, and we treat the question as a systems problem, for the first time. We build -, which tames the underlying search problem by blending a new encoding of the problem, hardware acceleration, and a careful choice of a suitable SMT solver. also introduces a technique to address the challenge of garbage collection in this context. improves over natural baselines by at least 10× in the problem size it can handle, while imposing modest overhead on clients.
Introduction and motivation
A new class of cloud databases has emerged, including products from Google [14, 15, 53] , Amazon [2, 112] , Microsoft Azure [3] , as well as their "cloud-native" open source alternatives [5, 10, 11, 26] . Compared to earlier generations of NoSQL databases (such as Facebook Cassandra, Google Bigtable, and Amazon S3), members of the new class offer the same scalability, availability, replication, and geodistribution but in addition support a powerful programming construct: strong ACID transactions. By "strong", we mean that the promised isolation contract is serializability [42, 93] : all transactions appear to execute in a single, sequential order.
Serializability is the "gold standard" isolation level [36] , and the one that many applications and programmers implicitly assume (in the sense that their code is incorrect if the database provides a weaker contract) [114] . 1 As the essential correctness contract, serializability is the visible part of the 1 Of course, there is something stronger, namely strict serializability [43, 93] (ss), which reflects real-time constraints; while the ss property is easier to verify, it's harder to provide with dependable performance [84] . For that reason, many of these databases [6, 25] offer non-strict serializability, hence our focus on that property. entire iceberg (the cloud). This has to do with how the cloud database is used [16, 19] : a user (developer or administrator) deploys, for example, web servers as database clients. And, based on whether the observed behaviors from clients are serializable, the user can deduce whether the cloud database has operated as expected. In particular, if the database has satisfied serializability throughout one's observation, then the user knows that the database maintains basic integrity: each value read derives from a valid write. It also implies that the database has survived failures (if any) during this period.
A user can legitimately wonder whether cloud databases in fact provide the promised contract. For one thing, users have no visibility into a cloud database's internals. Any internal corruption-as could happen from misconfiguration, misoperation, compromise, or adversarial control at any layer of the execution stack-can result in serializability violation. And for another, one need not adopt a paranoid stance ("the cloud as malicious adversary") to acknowledge that it is difficult, as a technical matter, to provide serializability and geodistribution and geo-replication and high performance under various failures [29, 62, 122] . Doing so usually involves a consensus protocol that interacts with an atomic commit protocol [53, 80, 87 ]-a complex, and hence potentially bugprone, combination.
As serializability is a critical guarantee, verifying that the database is serializable is an important issue. Indeed, existing works [47, 70, 92, 104, 110, 117, 119] can verify serializability and/or other consistency anomalies. However, these works share a limitation: they require "inside information"-(parts of) the internal schedules of the database. Crucially, such internal schedules are invisible to the clients of cloud databases. This leads to our question: how can clients verify the serializability of a cloud database without inside information?
On the one hand, this question has long been known to be intractable: Papadimitriou proved its NP-completeness 40 years ago [93] . On the other hand, one of the remarkable aspects in the field of formal verification has been the use of heuristics to "solve" problems whose general form is intractable [61, 71, 72] (to cite just a few recent examples). This owes to major advances in solvers (advanced SAT and SMT solvers) [37, 44, 50, 57, 67, 83, 91, 109] , coupled with an explosion of computing power. Thus, our guiding intuition is that it ought to be possible to verify serializability (without inside information) in many real-world cases.
And so, we are motivated to treat the italicized question as a systems problem, for the first time. Compared to prior works [86, 101, 104, 117] ( §7), our underlying technical problem is different and computationally harder, which consists of (a) positing an unmodifiable and black-box database, (b) retaining the database's throughput and latency, and (c) checking serializability, rather than a weaker property. This paper describes a system called . comprises a third-party database (which does not modify); a set of (legacy) database clients (which modifies to link to a library); one or more history collectors that record requests and responses to the database; and a verifier. The history collectors periodically send history fragments to the verifier, which has to determine whether the observed history is serializable. The deployer of (also, the user of the cloud database) defines the trust domain which encompasses database clients, collectors, and the verifier; while the database is untrusted. Section 2 further details the setup. -'s verifier solves two main problems, outlined below. 1. Efficient witness search ( §3). One can check serializability by searching for an acyclic graph whose vertices are transactions and whose edges obey certain constraints; a constraint specifies that exactly one of two edges must be in the searched-for graph. From this description, one suspects that a SAT/SMT solver [24, 38, 57, 108] would be useful. But complications arise. To begin with, encoding acyclicity in a SAT instance brings overhead [63, 64, 76] (we see this too; §6.1). Instead, uses a recent SMT solver, MonoSAT [40] , that is well-suited to checking graph properties ( §3.4). However, even MonoSAT alone is too inefficient ( §6.1).
To address this issue, reduces the search problem size. First, introduces a new encoding that exploits common patterns in real workloads, such as read-modifywrite transactions, to efficiently infer ordering relationships from a history ( §3.1- §3.2). (We prove that 's encoding is a valid reduction in Appendix A.) Second, uses parallel hardware (our implementation uses GPUs; §5) to compute all-paths reachability over the known graph edges; then, is able to efficiently resolve some of the constraints, by testing whether a candidate edge would generate a cycle with an existing path.
2. Garbage collection and scaling ( §4). 's verifier works in rounds. From round-to-round, however, the verifier must trim history, otherwise verification would become too costly. The challenge is that the verifier seemingly needs to retain all history, because serializability does not respect realtime ordering, so future transactions can read from values that (in a real-time view) have been overwritten ( §4.1). To solve this problem, clients issue periodic fence transactions ( §4.2). The fences impose coarse-grained synchronization, creating a window from which future reads, if they are to be serializable, are permitted to read. This allows the verifier to discard transactions prior to the window. We implement ( §5) and find ( §6) that, compared to our baselines, delivers at least a 10× improvement in the problem size it can handle (verifying a history of 10k transactions in 14 seconds), while imposing minor throughput and latency overhead on clients. End-to-end, on an ongoing basis, can sustainably verify 1k-2.5k txn/sec on the workloads that we experiment with.
's main limitations are: First, given the underlying problem is NP-complete, theoretically there is no guarantee that can terminate (though all our experiments finish in reasonable time, §6). Second, range queries are not natively supported by
; programmers need to add extra meta-data in database schemas to help check serializability on range queries. Figure 1 depicts 's high-level architecture. Clients issue requests to a database and receive results. The database is untrusted: the results can be arbitrary.
Overview and background
Each client request is one of five operations: start, commit, abort (which refer to transactions), and read and write (which refer to keys). Each client is single-threaded: it waits to receive the result of the current request before issuing the next request.
A set of history collectors sit between clients and the database, and capture the requests that clients issue and the (possibly wrong) results delivered by the database. This capture is a fragment of a history. A history is a set of operations; it is the union of the fragments from all collectors.
A verifier retrieves history fragments from collectors and verifies whether the history is serializable; we defined this term loosely in the introduction and will make it more precise below ( §2.1). Verification proceeds in rounds; each round consists of a witness search, the input to which is logically the output of the previous round and new history fragments. Clients, history collectors, and the verifier are trusted.
's architecture is relevant in real-world scenarios. As an example, an enterprise web application uses a cloud database for stability, performance, and fault-tolerance. The end-users of this application are geo-distributed employees of the enterprise. To avoid confusion, note that the employees are users of the application, and the clients here are the web application servers, as clients of the database.
Database clients (the application) run on the enterprise's hardware ("on-premises") while the database runs on an untrusted cloud provider. The verifier also runs on-premises. In this setup, collectors can be middleboxes situated at the edge of the enterprise and can thereby capture the requests and responses between the clients and the database in the cloud.
The rest of this section defines the core problem more precisely and gives the starting point for 's solution. Section 3 describes 's techniques for a single instance of the problem while Section 4 describes the techniques needed to stitch rounds together.
Preliminaries
First, assume that each value written to the database is unique; thus, from the history, any read (in a transaction) can be associated with the unique transaction that issued the corresponding write. discharges this assumption with logic in the client library ( §5). A history is a set of read and write operations, each of which is associated with a transaction. Each read operation must read from a particular write operation in the history. A history is serializable if it matches a serial schedule [93] . A schedule is a total order of all operations in the history. A history and schedule match each other if executing the operations following the schedule on a set of single-copy data produces the same read results as the history. (The write operations are assumed to have empty returns so are irrelevant in matching a history and a schedule.) A serial schedule means that the schedule does not have overlapping transactions. In addition to a serializable history, we also say a schedule is serializable if the schedule is equivalent to a serial scheduleexecuting the two schedules generates the same read results and leaves the data in the same final state.
A schedule implies an ordering for every pair of conflicting operations; two operations conflict if they are from different transactions and at least one is write. These orderings (all of them) form a set of dependencies among the transactions. For example, if an operation of a transaction T 1 writes a key, and later in the schedule, an operation of transaction T 2 writes the same key, the dependency set contains a dependency denoted as T 1 → T 2 .
From a schedule and its dependency set, one can construct a precedence graph that has a vertex for every transaction in the schedule and a directed edge for every dependency implied by the schedule. An important fact is that if the precedence graph is acyclic, a serial schedule that is equivalent to the original schedule can be derived, by topologically sorting the precedence graph.
Verification problem statement
Based on the immediately preceding fact, the question of whether a history is serializable can be converted to whether the history matches a schedule whose precedence graph is acyclic. So, the core problem is to identify such a precedence graph, or assert that none exists.
Note that this question would be straightforward if the database revealed its actual schedule (thus ruling out any other possible schedule): one could construct that schedule's precedence graph, and test it for acyclicity. Indeed, this is the problem of testing conflict-serializability [115] . Our problem, however, is testing view-serializability [118] . 2 In our context, where the database is a black box ( §1, §2), we have to (implicitly) find schedules that match the history, and test those schedules' precedence graphs for acyclicity. Intuitively, we will conduct this search by first listing all edges that must exist-for example, a transaction reads from another's write-and then consider the edges between every other pair of conflicting transactions (operations) as possibilities.
Starting point: Intuition and brute force
This section describes a brute-force solution, which serves as the starting point for and gives intuition. The approach relies on a data structure called a polygraph [93] , which captures all possible precedence graphs when some of the dependencies are unknown.
In a polygraph, vertices (V) are transactions and edges (E) are read-dependencies. A set C, which we call constraints, indicates possible (but unknown) dependencies. Here is an example polygraph:
, and one constraint (T 3 , T 2 ), (T 2 , T 1 ) which is shown as two dashed arrows connected by an arc. This constraint captures the fact that T 3 cannot happen in between T 1 and T 2 , because T 3 reads x from T 1 ; and T 2 which writes x either happens before T 1 or after T 3 . But it is unknown which option is the truth.
Formally, a polygraph P = (V, E, C) is a directed graph (V, E) together with a set of bipaths, C; that is, pairs of edges-not necessarily in E-of the form (v, u), (u, w) such that (w, v) ∈ E. A bipath of that form can be read as "either u happened after v, or else u happened before w". Now, define the polygraph (V, E, C) associated with a history, as follows [115] :
• V are all committed transactions in the history
The edges in E capture a class of dependencies ( §2.1) that are evident from the history, known as WR dependencies (a transaction writes a key, and another transaction reads the value written to that key). The third bullet describes how uncertainty is encoded into constraints. Specifically, for each WR dependency in the history, all other transactions that write the same key either happen before the given write or else after the given read.
A precedence graph is called compatible with a polygraph if: the precedence graph has the same nodes and known edges in the polygraph, and the precedence graph chooses one edge out of each constraint. Formally, a precedence graph (V , E ) is compatible with a polygraph (V, E, C) if: V = V , E ⊆ E , and ∀ e 1 , e 2 ∈ C, (e 1 ∈ E ∧e 2 / ∈ E )∨(e 1 / ∈ E ∧e 2 ∈ E ). A crucial fact is: there exists an acyclic precedence graph that is compatible with the polygraph associated to a history if and only if that history is serializable [93, 115] . This yields a brute-force approach for verifying serializability: first, construct a polygraph from a history; second, search for a compatible precedence graph that is acyclic. However, not only does this approach need to consider |C| binary choices (2 |C| possibilities) but also |C| is massive: it is a sum of quadratic terms, specifically k∈K p k · (q k − 1), where K is the set of keys in the history, and each p k , q k are (respectively) the number of reads and writes of key k. Figure 2 depicts the verifier and the major components of verification. This section covers one round of verification. As a simplification, assume that the round runs in a vacuum; Section 4 discusses how rounds are linked.
Verifying serializability in
uses an SMT solver geared to graph properties, specifically MonoSAT [40] ( §3.4). Yet, despite MonoSAT's power, encoding the problem as in Section 2.3 would generate too much work for it ( §6.1).
refines that encoding in several ways. It introduces write combining ( §3.1) and coalescing ( §3.2). These techniques are motivated by common patterns in workloads, and efficiently extract restrictions (on the search space) that are available in the history.
's verifier also does its own inference ( §3.3), prior to invoking the solver. This is motivated by observing that (a) having all-pairs reachability information (in the "known edges") yields quick resolution of many constraints, and (b) computing that information is amenable to acceleration on parallel hardware such as GPUs (the computation is iterated matrix multiplication; §5). Figure 3 depicts the algorithm that constructs 's encoding and shows how the techniques combine. Note thatrelies on a generalized notion of constraints. Whereas previously a constraint was a pair of edges, now a constraint is a pair of sets of edges. Meeting a constraint A, B means including all edges in A and excluding all in B, or vice versa. More formally, we say that a precedence graph (V , E ) is compatible with a known graph G = (V, E) and generalized constraints C if:
We prove the validity of 's encoding in Appendix A. Specifically we prove that there exists an acyclic graph that is compatible with the constraints constructed by on a given history if and only if the history is serializable.
Combining writes
exploits the read-modify-write (RMW) pattern, in which a transaction reads a key and then writes the same key. The pattern is common in real-world scenarios, for example shopping: in one transaction, get the number of an item in stock, decrement, and write back the number. uses RMWs to impose order on writes; this reduces the orderings that the verification procedure would otherwise have to consider. Here is an example:
g, readfrom, wwpairs ← CreateKnownGraph(history) 3:
con ← GenConstraints(g, readfrom, wwpairs) 4:
con, g ← Prune(con, g) // §3.3, executed one or more times 5:
return con, g 6: 7: procedure C K G (history) 8:
g ← empty graph // the known graph 9:
wwpairs ← map { Key, Tx → Tx} // consecutive writes 10:
// map from a write Tx to a set of read Txs that read this write 11:
readfrom ← map { Key, Tx → Set Tx } 12:
for transaction tx in history: 13: g.Nodes += tx 14:
for read operation rop in tx: 15: g InferRWEdges(chains, readfrom, g) // infer anti-dependency 36: 37:
con ← empty set 38:
for key, chainset in chains: 39: for every pair {chain i , chain j } in chainset: 40:
con += Coalesce(chain i , chain j , key, readfrom) // §3.2 41: 42:
return con 43: procedure C W (chains, wwpairs) 44:
for key, tx 1 , tx 2 in wwpairs: 45:
// By construction of wwpairs, tx 1 is the write immediately 46:
// preceding tx 2 on key. Thus, we can sequence all writes 47:
// prior to tx 1 before all writes after tx 2 , as follows: for key, chainset in chains: 55: for chain in chainset: 56: for i in [0, length(chain) − 2]: 57:
for return edge set 74: 75: procedure P (con, g) 76:
// tr is the transitive closure (reachability of every two nodes) of g 77:
tr ← TransitiveClosure(g) // standard algorithm; see [54, Ch.25] 78:
for c = edge set 1 , edge set 2 in con: 79: if ∃(tx i , tx j ) ∈ edge set 1 s.t. tx j tx i in tr: 80: g.Edges ← g.Edges ∪ edge set 2 81:
con −= c 82: else if ∃(tx i , tx j ) ∈ edge set 2 s.t. tx j tx i in tr: 83: g.Edges ← g.Edges ∪ edge set 1 84:
con −= c 85:
return con, g Figure 3 : 's procedure for converting a history into a constraint satisfaction problem ( §3). After this procedure, feeds the results (a graph of known edges G and set of constraints C) to a constraint solver ( §3.4), which searches for a graph that includes the known edges from G, meets the constraints in C, and is acyclic. We prove the algorithm's validity in Appendix A.
There are four transactions, all operating on the same key. Two of the transactions are RMW, namely R 2 , W 2 and R 4 , W 4 . On the left is the basic polygraph ( §2.3); it has four constraints (each in a different color), which are derived from considering WR dependencies. , however, infers chains. A single chain comprises a sequence of transactions whose write operations are consecutive; in the figure, a chain is indicated by a shaded area. Notice that the only ordering possibilities exist at the granularity of chains (rather than individual writes); in the example, the two possibilities of course are [W 1 ,
. This is a reduction in the possibility space; for instance, the original version considers the possibility that W 3 is immediately prior to W 1 (the upward dashed black arrow), but "recognizes" the impossibility of that.
To construct chains, initializes every write as a oneelement chain (Figure 3 , line 32). Then, consolidates chains: for each RMW transaction t and the transaction t that contains the prior write, concatenates the chain containing t and the chain containing t (lines 23 and 44-51).
Note that if a transaction t, which is not an RMW, reads from a transaction u, then t requires an edge to u's successor (call it v); otherwise, t could appear in the precedence graph downstream of v, which would mean t actually read from v (or even from a later write), which does not respect history.
creates the t → v edge (known as an anti-dependency in the literature [27] ) in InferRWEdges (Figure 3 , line 53).
Coalescing constraints
This technique exploits the fact that, in many real-world workloads, there are far more reads than writes. At a high level, combines all reads that read-from the same write. We give an example and then generalize.
three constraints one coalesced constraint
In the above figure, there are five single-operation transactions, to the same key. On the left is the basic polygraph ( §2.3), which contains three constraints; each is in a different color. Notice that all three constraints involve the question: which write happened first, W 1 or W 2 ? One can represent the possibilities as a constraint A ,
To construct constraints using the above reductions, does the following. Whereas the brute-force approach uses all reads and their prior writes ( §2.3), considers particular pairs of writes, and creates constraints from these writes and their following reads. The particular pairs of writes are the first and last writes from all pairs of chains pertaining to that key. In more detail, given two chains, chain i , chain j ,constructs a constraint c by (i) creating a set of edges ES 1 that point from reads of chain i .tail to chain j .head (Figure 3 , lines 71-72); this is why does not include the (W 1 , W 2 ) edge above. If there are no such reads, ES 1 is chain i .tail → chain j .head (Figure 3 , line 67); (ii) building another edge set ES 2 that is the other way around (reads of chain j .tail point to chain i .head, etc.), and (iii) setting c to be ES 1 , ES 2 (Figure 3 , line 63).
Pruning constraints
Our final technique leverages the information that is encoded in paths in the known graph. This technique culls irrelevant possibilities en masse ( §6.1). The underlying logic of the technique is almost trivial. The interesting aspect here is that the technique is enabled by a design decision to accelerate the computation of reachability on parallel hardware ( §5 and Figure 3 , line 77); this can be done since the computation is iterated (Boolean) matrix multiplication. Here is an example:
The constraint is (R 3 , W 2 ), (W 2 , W 1 ) . Having precomputed reachability, knows that the first choice cannot hold, as it creates a cycle with the path W 2 R 3 ; thereby concludes that the second choice holds. Generalizing, if determines that an edge in a constraint generates a cycle, throws away both components of the entire constraint and adds all the other edges to the known graph ( Figure 3 , lines 78-84). In fact, does pruning multiple times, if necessary ( §5).
Solving
The remaining step is to search for an acyclic graph that is compatible with the known graph and constraints, as computed in Figure 3 .
does this by leveraging a constraint solver. However, traditional solvers do not perform well on this task because encoding the acyclicity of a graph as a set of SAT formulas is expensive (a claim by Janota et al. [76] , which we also observed, using their acyclicity encodings on Z3 [57] ; §6.1).
instead leverages MonoSAT, which is a particular kind of SMT solver [44] that includes SAT modulo monotonic theories [40] . This solver efficiently encodes and checks graph properties, such as acyclicity.
represents a verification problem instance (a graph G and constraints C) as follows.
creates a Boolean variable E (i,j) for each edge: True means the ith node has an edge to the jth node; False means there is no such edge.sets all the edges in G to be True. For the constraints C, recall that each constraint A, B is a pair of sets of edges, and represents a mutually exclusive choice to include either all edges in A or else all edges in B.
encodes this in the natural way:
). Finally, enforces the acyclicity of the searched-for compatible graph (whose candidate edges are given by the known edges and the constrained edge variables) by invoking a primitive provided by the solver.
vs. MonoSAT. One might ask: if
's encoding makes MonoSAT faster, why use MonoSAT? Can we take the domain knowledge further? Indeed, in the limiting case, could re-implement the solver! However, MonoSAT, as an SMT solver, seamlessly leverages many prior optimizations. One way to think about the decomposition of function in is that 's preprocessing exploits some of the structure created by the problem of verifying serializability, whereas the solver is exploiting residual structure common to many graph problems.
Garbage collection and scaling
verifies periodically, in rounds. There are two motivations for rounds. First, new history is continually produced, of course. Second, there are limits on the maximum problem size (in terms of number of transactions) that the verifier can handle ( §6.2); breaking the task into rounds keeps each solving task manageable.
In the first round, a verifier starts with nothing and creates a graph from C K G , then does verification. After that, the verifier receives more client histories; it reuses the graph from the last round (the g in C E , Figure 3 , line 5), and adds new nodes and edges to it from the new history fragments received ( Figure 2) .
The technical problem is to keep the input to verification bounded. So the question must answer is: which transactions can be deleted safely from history? Below, we describe the challenge ( §4.1), the core mechanism of fence transactions ( §4.2), and how the verifier deletes safely ( §4.3). Due to space restrictions, we only describe the general rules and insights. A complete specification and correctness proof are in Appendix B.
The challenge
The core challenge is that past transactions can be relevant to future verifications, even when those transactions' writes have been overwritten. Here is an example:
R4(x) R4(y) before deletion after deletion T1  T2  T3   T4   T1  T3 T4 Suppose a verifier saw three transactions (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ) and wanted to remove T 2 (the shaded transaction) from consideration in future verification rounds. Later, the verifier observes a new transaction T 4 that violates serializability by reading from T 1 and T 3 . To see the violation, notice that T 2 is logically subsequent to T 4 , which generates a cycle
). Yet, if we remove T 2 , there is no cycle. Hence, removing T 2 is not safe: future verifications would fail to detect certain kinds of serializability violations.
Note that this does not require malicious or exotic behavior from the database. For example, consider an underlying database that uses multi-version values and is geo-replicated: a client can retrieve a stale version from a local replica.
Finally, we note that if the database told the verifier when values are permanently overwritten, the verifier could use this information to delete safely [60, 68] . But in our setup ( §2), the verifier does not get that information.
Fence transactions and epochs
addresses this challenge by introducing fence transactions that impose a coarse-grained ordering on all transactions; the verifier can then discard "old" transactions suggested by fence transactions. A fence transaction is a transaction that reads-and-writes a single key named "fence" (a dedicated key that is used by fence transactions only). Each client issues fence transactions periodically (for example, every 20 transactions).
The fence transactions are designed to divide transactions into different epochs in the serial schedule. What prevents the database from defeating the point of fences by placing all of the fence transactions at the beginning of a notional serial schedule? The answer is that requires that the database's serialization order not violate the order of transactions issued by a given client (which, recall, are singlethreaded and block; §2). Production databases are supposed to respect this requirement; doing otherwise would violate causality. With this, the epoch ordering is naturally intertwined with the rest of the workload.
Given the preceding requirement, the verifier adds "clientorder edges" to the set of known edges in g (the verifier knows the client order from the history collector). The verifier also assigns an epoch number to each transaction. To do so, the verifier traverses the known graph (g), locates all the fence transactions, chains them into a list based on RMW relation ( §3), and assigns their position in the list as their epoch numbers. Then, the verifier scans the graph again, and for each normal transaction on a client that is between fences with epoch i and epoch j (j > i), the verifier assigns the normal transaction with an epoch number j − 1.
During the scan, assume the largest epoch number that has been seen or surpassed by every client is epoch agree , then we have the following guarantee.
Guarantee. For any transaction T i whose epoch ≤ (epoch agree − 2), and for any transaction (including future ones) T j whose epoch ≥ epoch agree , the known graph g contains a path T i T j .
To see why the guarantee holds, consider the problem in three parts. First, for the fence transaction with epoch number epoch agree (denoted as F ea ), g must have a path F ea T j . Second, for the fence transaction with epoch number (epoch agree − 1) (denoted as F ea−1 ), g must have a path as
The guarantee suggests that no future transaction (with epoch ≥ epoch agree ) can be a direct predecessor of such T i , otherwise a cycle will appear in the polygraph. We can extend this property to use in garbage collection. In particular, if all predecessors of T i have epoch number ≤ (epoch agree −2), we call T i a frozen transaction, referring to the fact that no future transaction can be its (transitive) predecessor.
Safe garbage collection
's garbage collection algorithm targets frozen transactions-as they are guaranteed to be no descendants of future transactions. Of all frozen transactions, the verifier needs to keep those which have the most recent writes to some key (because they might be read by future transactions). If there are multiple writes to the same key and the verifier cannot distinguish which is the most recent one, the verifier keeps them all. Meanwhile, if a future transaction reads from a deleted transaction (which is a serializability violation-stale read), the verifier detects this (the verifier maintains tombstones for the deleted transaction ids) and rejects the history.
One would think the above approach is enough, as we did during developing the garbage collection algorithm. However, this turns out to be insufficient, which we illustrate using an example below.
In this example, the shaded transaction (T 3 ; transaction ids indicated by operation subscripts) is frozen and is not the most recent write to any key. However, with the two future transactions (T 7 and T 8 ), deleting the shaded transaction results in failing to detect cycles in the polygraph.
To see why, consider operations on key c: W 4 (c), W 5 (c), and R 8 (c). By the epoch guarantee ( §4.2), both T 4 and T 5 happen before T 8 . Plus, R 8 (c) reads from W 5 (c), hence W 4 (c) must happen before W 5 (c) (otherwise, R 8 (c) should have read from W 4 (c)). In which case, the constraint (T 5 , T 4 ), (T 4 , T 3 ) is solved (T 5 → T 4 conflicts with the fact that W 4 (c) happens before W 5 (c); hence, T 4 → T 3 is chosen). Similarly, because of R 7 (d), the other constraint is solved and
The reason for the prior undetected cycle is that the future transaction may "finalize" some constraints from the past, causing cycles whereas in the past the constraints were "chosen" in a different way. To prevent cases like this, 's verifier keeps transactions that are involved in any potentially cyclic constraints.
Implementation
The ifier. 's client library wraps other database libraries: JDBC, Google Datastore library, and RocksJava. It enforces the assumption of uniquely written values ( §2.1), by adding a unique id to a client's writes, and stripping them out of reads. It also issues fence transactions ( §4.2). Finally, in our current implementation, we simulate history collection ( §2) by collecting histories in this library; future work is to move this function to a proxy.
For the verifier, we discuss two aspects of pruning ( §3.3). First, the verifier iterates the pruning logic within a round, stopping when either it finds nothing more to prune or else when it reaches a configurable maximum number of iterations (to bound the verifier's work); a better implementation would stop when the cost of the marginal pruning iteration exceeds the improvement in the solver's running time brought by this iteration.
The second aspect is GPU acceleration. Recall that pruning works by computing the transitive closure of the known edges ( Fig. 3, line 77 ).
uses the standard algorithm: repeated squaring of the Boolean adjacency matrix [54, Ch.25] as long as the matrix keeps changing, up to log |V| matrix multiplications. (log |V| is the worst case and occurs when two nodes are connected by a (≥ |V|/2+1)-step path; at least in our experiments, this case does not arise much.) The execution platform is cuBLAS [7] (a dense linear algebra library on GPUs) and cuSPARSE [8] (a sparse linear algebra library on GPUs), which contain matrix multiplication routines.
includes several optimizations. It invokes a specialized routine for triangular matrix multiplication. ( first tests the graph for acyclicity, and then indexes the vertices according to a topological sort, creating a triangular matrix.) also exploits sparse matrix multiplication (cuS-PARSE), and moves to ordinary (dense) matrix multiplication when the density of the matrix exceeds a threshold (chosen to be ≥ 5% of the matrix elements are non-zero, the empirical cross-over point that we observed).
Whenever
's verifier detects a serializable violation, it creates a certificate with problematic transactions. The problematic transactions are either a cycle in the known graph detected by 's algorithm, or a minimal unsatisfiable core (a set of unsatisfiable clauses that translates to problematic transactions) produced by the SMT solver.
Experimental evaluation
We answer three questions:
• What are the verifier's costs and limits, and how do these compare to baselines? • What is the verifier's end-to-end, round-to-round sustainable capacity? This determines the offered load (on the actual database) that the verifier can support. • How much runtime overhead (in terms of throughput and latency) does impose for clients? And what are -'s storage and network overheads?
Benchmarks and workloads. We use four benchmarks:
• TPC-C [23] is a standard. A warehouse has 10 districts with 30k customers. There are five types of transactions (frequencies in parentheses): new order (45%), payment (43%), order status (4%), delivery (4%), and stock level (4%). In our experiments, each client randomly chooses a warehouse and a district, and issues a transaction based on the frequencies above.
• C-Twitter [4] is a simple clone of Twitter, according to
Twitter's own description [4] . It allows users to tweet a new post, follow/unfollow other users, show a timeline (the latest tweets from followed users). Our experiments include a thousand users. Each user tweets 140-word posts and follows/unfollows other users based on Zipfian distribution (α = 100). • C-RUBiS [22, 30] , simulates bidding systems like eBay [22] . Users can register accounts, register items, bid for items, and comment on items. We initialize the market with 20k users and 200k items. • BlindW is a microbenchmark we wrote to demonstrate 's performance in extreme scenarios. It creates a set of keys, and runs random read-only and write-only transactions on them. In our experiments, every transaction has eight operations, and there are 10k keys in total. This benchmark has two variants: (1) BlindW-RM represents a read-mostly workload that contains 90% read-only transactions; and (2) BlindW-RW represents a read-write workload, evenly divided between read-only and writeonly transactions.
Databases and setup. We evaluate on Google Cloud Datastore [14] , PostgreSQL [20, 97] , and RocksDB [21, 58] . They represent three database environments-cloud, local, and co-located. In our experimental setup, clients interact with Google Cloud Datastore through the wide-area Internet, and connect to a local PostgreSQL server through a local 1Gbps network.
In the cloud and local database setups, clients run on two machines with a 3.3GHz Intel i5-6600 (4-core) CPU, 16GB memory, a 250GB SSD, and Ubuntu 16.04. In the local database setup, a PostgreSQL server runs on a machine with a 3.8GHz Intel Xeon E5-1630 (8-core) CPU, 32GB memory, a 1TB disk, and Ubuntu 16.04. In the co-located setup, the same machine hosts the client threads and RocksDB threads, which all run in the same process. We use a p3.2xlarge Amazon EC2 instance as the verifier, with an NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPU, a 8-core CPU, and 64GB memory.
One-shot verification
In this section, we consider "one-shot verification", the original serializability verification problem: a verifier gets a history and decides whether that history is serializable. In our setup, clients record histories fragments and store them as files; a verifier reads them from the local file system. In this section, the database is RocksDB (PostgreSQL gives similar results; Google Cloud Datastore limits the throughput for a fresh database instance which causes some time-outs).
Baselines. We have two baselines:
• Z3 [57] : we encode the serializability verification problem into a set of SAT formulas, where edges are Boolean variables. We use binary labeling [76] to express acyclicity, requiring Θ(|V| 2 ) SAT formulas. • MonoSAT [40] (with the "brute force" encoding): we implement the original polygraph ( §2.3), directly encode the constraints (without the techniques of §3), and feed them to MonoSAT.
Verification runtime vs. number of transactions.
We compare to other baselines, on the various workloads. There are 24 clients. We vary the total number of transactions in the workload, and measure the total verification time. In benchmarks with RMWs only (the left one), there is no constraint, so doesn't do pruning (see also footnote 3, page 9); in benchmarks with many reads and RMWs (the middle three), the dominant component is pruning not solving, because -'s own logic can identify concrete dependencies; in benchmarks with many blind writes (the last one), solving is a much larger contributor because is not able to eliminate as many constraints. Figure 7 : Serializability violations that checks. "Violation" describes the phenomena that clients experience. "Database" is the database (with version number) that generates the violation. "#Txns" is the size of the violation history. "Time" is the runtime for to detect such violation. The bug report only provides the history snippet that violates serializability.
Detecting serializability violations.
In order to investigate 's performance on an unsatisfiable instance: does it trigger an exhaustive search, at least on the real-world workloads we found? We evaluate on five real-world workloads that are known to have serializability violations. detects them in reasonable time. Figure 7 shows the results.
Decomposition of 's verification runtime.
We measure the wall clock time of 's verification on our setup, broken into three stages: constructing, which includes creating the graph of known edges, combining writes, and creating constraints ( §3.1- §3.2); pruning ( §3.3), which includes the time taken by the GPU; and solving ( §3.4), which includes the time spent within MonoSAT. We experiment with all benchmarks, with 10k transactions. Figure 6 depicts the results.
Differential analysis. We experiment with four variants:
itself; without pruning ( §3.3); without pruning and coalescing ( §3.2), which is equivalent to MonoSAT plus write combining ( §3.1); and the MonoSAT baseline. We experiment with three benchmarks, with 10k transactions. Figure 8 depicts the results.
Scaling
We want to know: what offered load (to the database) cansupport on an ongoing basis? To answer this question, we must quantify 's verification capacity, in txns/second. This depends on the characteristics of the workload, the number of transactions one round ( §4) verifies (#tx r ), and the average time for one round of verification (t r ). Note that the variable here is #tx r ; t r is a function of that choice. So the verification capacity for a particular workload is defined as: max #txr (#tx r /t r ).
To investigate this quantity, we run our benchmarks on RocksDB with 24 concurrent clients, a fence transaction every 20 transactions. We generate a 100k-transaction history ahead of time. For that same history, we vary #tx r , plot #tx r /t r , and choose the optimum. On the left is the in-process setup; 90th percentile latency increases 64%, with 31% throughput penalty, an artifact of history collection (disk bandwidth contention between clients and the DB). In the middle is the local setup (PostgreSQL), where imposes minor overhead. Finally, on the right is the cloud setup; there is an artifact here too: the throughput penalty reflects a ceiling imposed by the cloud service for a fresh DB instance. Figure 9 depicts the results. When #tx r is smaller, wastes cycles on redundant verification; when #tx r is larger, suffers from a problem size that is too large (recall that verification time increases superlinearly; §6.1). For different workloads, the optimal choices of #tx r are different.
In workload BlindW-RW, runs out of GPU memory. The reason is that due to many blind writes in this workload, is unable to garbage collect enough transactions and fit the remaining history into the GPU memory. Our future work is to investigate this case and design a more efficient (in terms of deleting more transactions) algorithm.
online overheads
The baseline in this section is the legacy system; that is, clients use the unmodified database library (for example, JDBC), with no recording of history.
Throughput latency analysis. We evaluate 's clientside throughput and latency in the three setups, tuning the number of clients (up to 256) to saturate the databases. Network cost and history size. We evaluate the network traffic on the client side by tracking the number of bytes sent over the NIC. We measure the history size by summing sizes of the history files. Figure 11 summarizes.
Related work
Below, we cover many works that wish to verify or enforce the correctness of storage, some with very similar motivations to ours. As stated earlier ( §1), our problem statement is differentiated by combining requirements: (a) a black box database, (b) performance and concurrency approximating that of a --less system, and (c) checking view-serializability.
Isolation testing and Consistency testing. Serializability is a particular isolation level in a transactional system-the I in ACID transactions. Because checking view-serializability is NP-complete [93] , to the best of our knowledge, all works testing serializability prior to are checking conflictserializability where the write-write ordering is known. Sinha et al. [104] record the ordering of operations in a modified software transactional memory library to reduce the search space in checking serializability; this work uses the polygraph data structure ( §2.3). The idea of recording order to help test serializability has also been used in detecting data races in multi-threaded programs [70, 110, 117] .
In shared memory systems and systems that offer replication (but do not necessarily support transactions), there is an analogous correctness contract, namely consistency. (Confusingly, the "C(onsistency)" in ACID transactions refers to something else, namely semantic invariants [35] .) Example consistency models are linearizability [73] , sequential consistency [81] , and eventual consistency [95] .
Testing for these consistency models is an analogous problem to ours. In both cases, one searches for a schedule that fits the ordering constraints of both the model and the history [66] . As in checking serializability, the computational complexity of checking consistency decreases if a stronger model is targeted (for example, linearizability vs. sequential consistency) [65] , or if more ordering information can be (intrusively) acquired (by opening black boxes) [116] .
Concerto [32] uses deferred verification, allowing it to exploit an offline memory checking algorithm [45] to check online the sequential consistency of a highly concurrent keyvalue store. Concerto's design achieves orders-of-magnitude performance improvement compared to Merkle tree-based approaches [45, 90] , but it also requires modifications of the database. (See elsewhere [59, 82] for related algorithms.)
A body of work examines cloud storage consistency [28, 31, 85, 86] . These works rely on extra ordering information obtained through techniques like loosely-or wellsynchronized clocks [28, 31, 66, 78, 86] , or client-to-client communication [85, 103] . As another example, a gateway that sequences the requests can ensure consistency by enforcing ordering [75, 96, 103, 106] . Some of 's techniques are reminiscent of these works, such as its use of precedence graphs [31, 66] . However, a substantial difference is thatneither modifies the "memory" (the database) to get information about the actual internal schedule nor depends on external synchronization. of course exploits epochs for safe deletion ( §4), but this is a performance optimization, not core to the verification task, and invokes standard database interfaces.
Execution integrity.
Our problem relates to the broad category of execution integrity-ensuring that a module in another administrative domain is executing as expected. For example, Orochi [111] is an end-to-end audit that gives a verifier assurance that a given web application, including its database, is executing according to the code it is allegedly running. Orochi operates in a setting reminiscent of the one that we consider in this paper, in which there are collectors and an untrusted cloud service. Verena [77] operates in a similar model (but makes fewer assumptions, in that its hash server and application server are mutually distrustful); Verena uses authenticated data structures and a careful placement of function to guarantee to the deployer of a given web service, backed by a database, that the delivered web pages are correct. Orochi and Verena require that the database is strictly serializable, they provide end-to-end verification of a full stack, but they cannot treat that stack as a black box.
is the other way around: it of course tolerates (nonstrict) serializability, its verification purview is limited to the database, but it treats the database as a black box.
Other examples of execution integrity include AVM [69] and Ripley [113] , which involve checking an untrusted module by re-executing the inputs to it. These systems likewise are "full stack" but "not black box."
Another approach is to use trusted components. For exam-ple, Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) replication [51] (where the assumption is that a super-majority is not faulty) and TEEs (trusted execution environments, comprising TPMbased systems [52, 72, 88, 89, 94, 98, 100, 107] and SGXbased systems [33, 34, 39, 74, 79, 99, 102, 106] ) ensure that the right code is running. However, this does not ensure that the code itself is right; concretely, if a database violates serializability owing to an implementation bug, neither BFT nor SGX hardware helps.
There is also a class of systems that uses complexitytheoretic and cryptographic mechanisms [46, 101, 120, 121] . None of these works handle systems of realistic scale, and only one of them [101] handles concurrent workloads. An exception is Obladi [55] , which remarkably provides ACID transactions atop an ORAM abstraction by exploiting a trusted proxy that carefully manages the interplay between concurrency control and the ORAM protocol; its performance is surprisingly good (as cryptographic-based systems go) but still pays 1-2 orders of magnitude overhead in throughput and latency.
SMT solver on detecting serializability violations. Several works [48, 49, 92] propose using SMT solvers to detect serializability violations under weak consistency. The underlying problem is different: they focus on encoding static programs and the correctness criterion of weak consistency; whilefocuses on how to encode histories more efficiently. The most relevant work [105] is to use SMT solvers to permutate all possible interleaving for a concurrent program and search for serializablility violations. Despite of different setups, our baseline implementation on Z3 ( §6.1) has similar encoding and similar performance (verifying hundreds of transactions in tens of seconds).
Correctness testing for distributed systems.
There is a line of research on testing the correctness of distributed systems under various failures, including network partition [29] , power failures [122] , and storage faults [62] . In particular, Jepsen [9] is a black-box testing framework (also an analysis service) that has successfully detected massive amount of correctness bugs in some production distributed systems.
is complementary to Jepsen, providing the ability to check serializability of black-box databases.
Definitions and interpretations of isolation levels.
of course uses precedence graphs, which are a common tool for reasoning about isolation levels [27, 43, 93] . However, isolation levels can be interpreted via other means such as excluding anomalies [41] and client-centric observations [56] ;
it remains an open and intriguing question whether the other definitions would yield a more intuitive and more easilyimplemented encoding and algorithm than the one in .
A The validity of 's encoding
Recall the crucial fact in Section 2.3: an acyclic precedence graph that is compatible with a polygraph constructed from a history exists iff that history is serializable [93] . In this section, we establish the analogous statement for 's encoding. We do this by following the contours of Papadimitriou's proof of the baseline statement [93] . However 's algorithm requires that we attend to additional details, complicating the argument somewhat.
A.1 Definitions and preliminaries
In this section, we define the terms used in our main argument ( §A.2): history, schedule, polygraph, and chains.
History and schedule. The description of histories and schedules below restates what is in section 2.1.
A history is a set of read and write operations, each of which belongs to a transaction. 4 Each write operation in the history has a key and a value as its arguments; each read operation has a key as argument, and a value as its result. The result of a read operation is the same as the value argument of a particular write operation; we say that this read operation reads from this write operation. We assume each value is unique and can be associated to the corresponding write; in practice, this is guaranteed by 's client library described in Section 5. We also say that a transaction tx i reads (a key k) from another transaction tx j if: tx i contains a read rop, rop reads from write wrop on k, and tx j contains the write wrop.
A schedule is a total order of all operations in a history. A serial schedule means that the schedule does not have overlapping transactions. A history matches a schedule if: they have the same operations, and executing the operations in schedule order on a single-copy set of data results in the same read results as in the history. So a read reading-from a write indicates that this write is the read's most recent write (to this key) in any matching schedule.
Definition 1 (Serializable history).
A serializable history is a history that matches a serial schedule.
polygraph. In the following, we define a polygraph; this is a helper notion for the known graph (g in the definition below) and generalized constraints (con in the definition below) mentioned in Section 3.
Definition 2 (
polygraph). Given a history h, a polygraph Q(h) = (g, con) where g and con are generated by C E from Figure 3 .
We call a directed graphĝ compatible with a polygraph Q(h) = (g, con), ifĝ has the same vertices as g, in- 4 The term "history" [93] was originally defined on a fork-join parallel program schema. We have adjusted the definition to fit our setup ( §2). cludes the edges from g, and selects one edge set from each constraint in con.
Definition 3 (Acyclic polygraph).
A polygraph Q(h) is acyclic if there exists an acyclic graph that is compatible with Q(h).
Chains. When constructing a
polygraph from a history, function C W in 's algorithm (Figure 3) produces chains. One chain is an ordered list of transactions, associated to a key k, that (supposedly) contains a sequence of consecutive writes (defined below in Definition 5) on key k. In the following, we will first define what is a sequence of consecutive writes and then prove that a chain is indeed such a sequence.
Definition 4 (Successive write). In a history, a transaction tx i is a successive write of another transaction tx j on a key k, if (1) both tx i and tx j write to k and (2) tx i reads k from tx j .
Definition 5 (A sequence of consecutive writes). A sequence of consecutive writes on a key k of length n is a list of transactions
Although the overall problem of detecting serializability is NP-complete [93] , there are local malformations, which immediately indicate that a history is not serializable. We capture two of them in the following definition:
Definition 6 (An easily rejectable history). An easily rejectable history h is a history that either (1) contains a transaction that has multiple successive writes on one key, or (2) has a cyclic known graph g of Q(h).
An easily rejectable history is not serializable. First, if a history has condition (1) in the above definition, there exist at least two transactions that are successive writes of the same transaction (say tx i ) on some key k. And, these two successive writes cannot be ordered in a serial schedule, because whichever is scheduled later would read k from the other rather than from tx i . Second, if there is a cycle in the known graph, this cycle must include multiple transactions (because there are no self-loops, since we assume that transactions never read keys after writing to them). The members of this cycle cannot be ordered in a serial schedule.
Lemma 7.
rejects easily rejectable histories.
Proof.
(the algorithm in Figure 3 and the constraint solver) detects and rejects easily rejectable histories as follows. (1) If a transaction has multiple successive writes on the same key in h, 's algorithm explicitly detects this case. The algorithm checks, for transactions reading and writing the same key (line 19), whether multiple of them read this key from the same transaction (line 21). If so, the transaction being read has multiple successive writes, hence the algorithm rejects (line 22). (2) If the known graph has a cycle, detects and rejects this history when checking acyclicity in the constraint solver.
On the other hand, if a history is not easily rejectable, we want to argue that each chain produced by the algorithm is a sequence of consecutive writes.
Claim 8. If
's algorithm makes it to line 33 (immediately before C W ), then from this line on, any transaction writing to a key k appears in exactly one chain on k.
Proof. Prior to line 33, 's algorithm loops over all the write operations (line 30-31), creating a chain for each one (line 32). As in the literature [93, 115] , we assume that each transaction writes to a key only once. Thus, any tx writing to a key k has exactly one write operation to k and hence appears in exactly one chain on k in line 33.
Next, we argue that C W preserves this invariant. This suffices to prove the claim, because after line 33, only C W updates chains (variable chains in the algorithm).
The invariant is preserved by C W because each of its loop iterations splices two chains on the same key into a new chain (line 51) and deletes the two old chains (line 50). From the perspective of a transaction involved in a splicing operation, its old chain on key k has been destroyed, and it has joined a new one on key k, meaning that the number of chains it belongs to on key k is unchanged: the number remains 1.
One clarifying fact is that a transaction can appear in multiple chains on different keys, because a transaction can write to multiple keys.
Claim 9. If
's algorithm does not reject in line 22, then after C K G , for any two distinct entries ent 1 and ent 2 (in the form of key, tx i , tx j ) in wwpairs: if ent 1 .key = ent 2 .key, then ent 1 .tx i = ent 2 .tx i and ent 1 .tx j = ent 2 .tx j .
Proof. First, we prove ent 1 .tx i = ent 2 .tx i . In 's algorithm, line 23 is the only point where new entries are inserted into wwpairs. Because of the check in line 21-22, the algorithm guarantees that a new entry will not be inserted into wwpairs if an existing entry has the same key, tx i . Also, existing entries are never modified. Thus, there can never be two entries in wwpairs indexed by the same key, tx i . Second, we prove ent 1 .tx j = ent 2 .tx j . As in the literature [93, 115] , we assume that one transaction reads a key at most once. 5 As a consequence, the body of the loop in line 19, including line 23, is executed at most once for each (key,tx) pair. Therefore, there cannot be two entries in wwpairs that match key, , tx . Claim 10. In one iteration of C W (line 44), for ent i = key, tx 1 , tx 2 retrieved from wwpairs, there exist chain 1 and chain 2 , such that tx 1 is the tail of chain 1 and tx 2 is the head of chain 2 .
Proof. Invoking Claim 8, denote the chain on key that tx 1 is in as chain i ; similarly, denote tx 2 's chain as chain j .
Assume to the contrary that tx 1 is not the tail of chain i . Then there is a transaction tx next to tx 1 in chain i . But the only way for two transactions (tx 1 and tx ) to appear adjacent in a chain is through the concatenation in line 51, and that requires an entry ent j = key, tx 1 , tx in wwpairs. Because tx is already in chain i when the current iteration happens, ent j must have been retrieved in some prior iteration. Since ent i and ent j appear in different iterations, they are two distinct entries in wwpairs. Yet, both of them are indexed by key, tx 1 , which is impossible, by Claim 9. Now assume to the contrary that tx 2 is not the head of chain j . Then tx 2 has an immediate predecessor tx in chain j . In order to have tx and tx 2 appear adjacent in chain j , there must be an entry ent k = key, tx , tx 2 in wwpairs. Because tx is already in chain j when the current iteration happens, ent k must have been retrieved in an earlier iteration. So, ent k = key, tx , tx 2 and ent i = key, tx 1 , tx 2 are distinct entries in wwpairs, which is impossible, by Claim 9.
Lemma 11. If h is not easily rejectable, every chain is a sequence of consecutive writes after C W .
Proof. Because h is not easily rejectable, it doesn't contain any transaction that has multiple successive writes. Hence, 's algorithm does not reject in line 22 and can make it to C W . At the beginning (immediately before C W ), all chains are single-element lists (line 32). By Definition 5, each chain is a sequence of consecutive writes with only one transaction.
Assume that, before loop iteration t, each chain is a sequence of consecutive writes. We show that after iteration t (before iteration t + 1), chains are still sequences of consecutive writes.
If t ≤ size(wwpairs), then in line 44, 's algorithm gets an entry key, tx 1 , tx 2 from wwpairs, where tx 2 is tx 1 's successive write on key. Also, we assume one transaction does not read from itself (as in the literature [93, 115] ), and since tx 2 reads from tx 1 , tx 1 = tx 2 . Then, the algorithm references the chains that they are in: chain 1 and chain 2 .
First, we argue that chain 1 and chain 2 are distinct chains. By Claim 8, no transaction can appear in two chains on the same key, so chain 1 and chain 2 are either distinct chains or the same chain. Assume they are the same chain (chain 1 = chain 2 ). If chain 1 (= chain 2 ) is a single-element chain, then tx 1 (in chain 1 ) is tx 2 (in chain 2 ), a contradiction to tx 1 = tx 2 .
Consider the case that chain 1 (= chain 2 ) contains multiple transactions. Because tx 2 reads from tx 1 , there is an edge tx 1 → tx 2 (generated from line 15) in the known graph of Q(h). Similarly, because chain 1 is a sequence of consecutive writes (the induction hypothesis), any transaction tx in chain 1 reads from its immediate prior transaction, hence there is an edge from this prior transaction to tx. Since every pair of adjacent transactions in chain 1 has such an edge, the head of chain 1 has a path to the tail of chain 1 . Finally, by Claim 10, tx 2 is the head of chain 2 and tx 1 is the tail of chain 1 , as well as chain 1 = chain 2 , there is a path tx 2 tx 1 . Thus, there is a cycle (tx 1 → tx 2 tx 1 ) in the known graph, so h is easily rejectable, a contradiction.
Second, we argue that the concatenation of chain 1 and chain 2 , denoted as chain 1+2 , is a sequence of consecutive writes. Say the lengths of chain 1 and chain 2 are n and m respectively. Since chain 1 and chain 2 are distinct sequences of consecutive writes, all transactions in chain 1+2 are distinct and chain 1+2 [i] reads from chain 1+2 [i−1] for i ∈ {2, . . . , n+ m} \ {n + 1}. For i = n + 1, the preceding also holds, because tx 1 is chain 1 's tail (= chain 1+2 [n]), tx 2 is chain 2 's head (= chain 1+2 [n + 1]), and tx 2 is the successive write of tx 1 (tx 2 reads from tx 1 ). Thus, chain 1+2 is a sequence of consecutive writes, according to Definition 5.
If t > size(wwpairs) and the loop ends, then chains don't change. As they are sequences of consecutive writes after the final step (when t = size(wwpairs)), they still are after C W .
In the following, when we refer to chains, we mean the state of chains after executing C W .
A.2 The main argument
In this section, the two theorems (Theorem 12 and 17) together prove the validity of 's encoding.
Theorem 12. If a history h is serializable, then Q(h) is acyclic.
Proof. Because h is serializable, there exists a serial schedulê s that h matches.
Claim 13. For any transaction rtx that reads from a transaction wtx in h, rtx appears after wtx inŝ.
Proof. This follows from the definitions given at the start of the section: if rtx reads from wtx in h, then there is a read operation rop in rtx that reads from a write operation wrop in wtx. Thus, as stated earlier and by definition of matching, rop appears later than wrop inŝ. Furthermore, by definition of serial schedule, transactions don't overlap inŝ. Therefore, all of rtx appears after all of wtx inŝ.
Claim 14.
For any pair of transactions (rtx, wtx) where rtx reads a key k from wtx in h, no transaction wtx that writes to k can appear between wtx and rtx inŝ.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exists wtx that appears in between wtx and rtx inŝ. By Claim 13, rtx appears after wtx inŝ. Therefore, wtx appears inŝ before rtx and after wtx. Thus, inŝ, rtx does not return the value of k written by wtx. But in h, rtx returns the value of k written by wtx. Thus, s and h do not match, a contradiction.
In the following, we use head k and tail k as shorthands to represent, respectively, the head transaction and the tail transaction of chain k . And, we denote that tx i appears before tx j in s as tx i <ŝ tx j . Claim 15. For any pair of chains (chain i , chain j ) on the same key k, if head i <ŝ head j , then (1) tail i <ŝ head j and (2) for any transaction rtx that reads k from tail i , rtx <ŝ head j .
Proof. First, we prove tail i <ŝ head j . If head j ∈ chain j then head j ∈ chain i , by Claim 8. If chain i has only one transaction (meaning head i = tail i ), then tail i = head i <ŝ head j .
Next, if chain i is a multi-transaction chain, it can be written as tx 1 , · · · tx p , tx p+1 , · · · tx n .
By Lemma 11, chain i is a sequence of consecutive writes on k, so each transaction reads k from its prior transaction in chain i . Then, by Claim 13, tx p <ŝ tx p+1 , for 1 ≤ p < n. Now, assume to the contrary that head j <ŝ tail i (= tx n ). Then, by the given, tx 1 (= head i ) <ŝ head j <ŝ tx n . Thus, for some 1 ≤ p < n, we have tx p <ŝ head j <ŝ tx p+1 . But this is a contradiction, because tx p+1 reads k from tx p , and thus by Claim 14, head j cannot appear between them inŝ. Second, we prove that any transaction rtx that reads k from tail i appears before head j inŝ. Assume to the contrary that head j <ŝ rtx. We have from the first half of the claim that tail i <ŝ head j . Thus, head j appears between tail i and rtx inŝ, which is again a contradiction, by Claim 14.
Now we prove that Q(h) is acyclic by constructing a compatible graphĝ and provingĝ is acyclic. We have the following fact from function C .
Fact 16. In C , each constraint A, B is generated from a pair of chains (chain 1 , chain 2 ) on the same key k in line 60. All edges in edge set A point to head 2 , and all edges in B point to head 1 . This is because all edges in A have the form either (rtx, head 2 ) or (tail 1 , head 2 ); see lines 67 and 71-72. Similarly by swapping chain 1 and chain 2 (line 61 and 62), edges in B point to head 1 .
We construct graphĝ as follows: first, letĝ be the known graph of Q(h). Then, for each constraint A, B in Q(h), and letting head 1 and head 2 be defined as in Fact 16, add A toĝ if head 1 <ŝ head 2 , and otherwise add B toĝ. This process results in a directed graphĝ.
Next, we show that all edges inĝ are a subset of the total ordering inŝ; this impliesĝ is acyclic.
First, the edges in the known graph (line 15 and 58) are a subset of the total ordering given byŝ. Each edge added in line 15 represents that the destination vertex reads from the source vertex in h. By Claim 13, this ordering holds in s. As for the edges in line 58, they are added to capture the fact that a read operation (in transaction rtx) that reads from a write (in transaction chain [i] ) is sequenced before the next write on the same key (in transaction chain[i+1]), an ordering that also holds inŝ. (This is known as an anti-dependency in the literature [27] .) If this ordering doesn't hold inŝ, then chain[i + 1] <ŝ rtx, and thus chain[i] <ŝ chain[i + 1] <ŝ rtx, which contradicts Claim 14.
Second, consider the edges inĝ that come from constraints. Take a constraint A, B generated from chains (chain 1 , chain 2 ) on the same key. If head 1 <ŝ head 2 , then by Fact 16 and construction ofĝ, all added edges have the form (tail 1 , head 2 ) or (rtx, head 2 ), where rtx reads from tail 1 . By Claim 15, the source vertex of these edges appears prior to head 2 inŝ; thus, these edges respect the ordering inŝ. When head 2 <ŝ head 1 , the foregoing argument works the same, with appropriate relabeling. Hence, all constraint edges chosen inĝ are a subset of the total ordering given byŝ. This completes the proof.
Theorem 17. If Q(h) is acyclic, then the history h is serializable.
Proof. Given that Q(h) is acyclic, accepts h. Hence, by Lemma 7, h is not easily rejectable. And, by Lemma 11, each chain (after C W ) is a sequence of consecutive writes.
Because Q(h) is acyclic, there must exist an acyclic directed graph q that is compatible with Q(h).
Claim 18.
If tx i appears before tx j in a chain chain k , then graph q has tx i tx j .
Proof. Because chain k is a sequence of consecutive writes, a transaction tx in chain k reads from its immediate predecessor in chain k , hence there is an edge in the known graph (generated by line 15) from the predecessor to tx. Because every pair of adjacent transactions in chain k has such an edge and tx i appears before tx j in chain k , tx i tx j in Q(h)'s known graph. As q is compatible with Q(h), such a path from tx i to tx j also exists in q.
Claim 19.
For any chain chain i (on a key k) and any transaction wtx j ∈ chain i that writes to k, graph q has either: (1) paths from tail i and transactions that read keyfrom tail i (if any) to wtx j , or (2) paths from wtx j to all the transactions in chain i .
Proof. Call the chain that wtx j is in chain j . By Claim 8, chain j exists and chain j = chain i .
For chain i and chain j , Q(h) has a constraint A, B that is generated from them (line 40). This is because chain i and chain j touch the same key k, and 's algorithm creates one constraint for every pair of chains on the same key (line 39). (We assume chain i is the first argument of function C and chain j is the second.) First, we argue that the edges in edge set A establish tail i head j and rtx head j (rtx reads k from tail i ) in the known graph; and B establishes tail j head i . Consider edge set A. There are two cases: (i) there are reads rtx reading from tail i , and (ii) there is no such read. In case (i), the algorithm adds rtx → head j for every rtx reading-from tail i (line [71] [72] . And rtx → head j together with the edge tail i → rtx (added in line 15) establish tail i head j . In case (ii), 's algorithm adds an edge tail i → head j to A (line 67), and there is no rtx in this case. Similarly, by switching i and j in the above reasoning (except we don't care about the reads in this case), edges in B establish tail j head i . Second, because q is compatible with Q(h), it either (1) contains A: The argument still holds if wtx j = head j in case (1): remove the second step in (1) . Likewise, if wtx j = tail j in case (2), remove the first step in (2) .
Claim 20. For any pair of transactions (wtx, rtx) where rtx reads a key k from wtx and any other transaction wtx that writes to k, graph q has either wtx wtx or rtx wtx .
Proof. By Claim 8, wtx must appear in some chain chain i on k. Each of the three transactions (wtx, rtx, and wtx ) has two possibilities relative to chain i : 1. wtx is either the tail or non-tail of chain i . 2. rtx is either in chain i or not. 3. wtx is either in chain i or not. In the following, we enumerate all combinations of the above possibilities and prove the claim in all cases.
• wtx = tail i . Then, rtx is not in chain i . (If rtx is in chain i , its enclosing transaction would have to be subsequent to wtx in chain i , which is a contradiction, since wtx is last in the chain.)
• wtx ∈ chain i . Because wtx is the tail, wtx appears before wtx in chain i . Thus, wtx wtx in q (Claim 18).
• wtx ∈ chain i . By invoking Claim 19 for chain i and wtx , q either has (1) paths from each read (rtx is one of them) readingfrom tail i (= wtx) to wtx , therefore rtx wtx . Or else q has (2) paths from wtx to every transaction in chain i , and wtx ∈ chain i , thus wtx wtx.
Because chain i is a sequence of consecutive writes on k (Lemma 11) and rtx reads k from wtx, rtx is the successive write of wtx. Therefore, rtx appears immediately after wtx in chain i .
• wtx ∈ chain i . Because rtx appears immediately after wtx in chain i , wtx either appears before wtx or after rtx. By Claim 18, there is either wtx wtx or rtx wtx in q.
• wtx ∈ chain i .
By invoking Claim 19 for chain i and wtx , q either has (1) tail i wtx , together with rtx tail i (or rtx = tail i ) by Claim 18, therefore rtx wtx . Or else q has (2) wtx wtx (wtx has a path to every transaction in chain i , and wtx ∈ chain i ).
• rtx ∈ chain i .
If rtx ∈ chain i , because of I RWE (line 53), rtx has an edge (in the known graph, hence in q) to the transaction that immediately follows wtx in chain i , denoted as wtx * (and wtx * must exist because wtx is not the tail of the chain).
Because wtx * appears immediately after wtx in chain i , wtx either appears before wtx or after wtx * . By Claim 18, q has either wtx wtx or wtx * wtx which, together with edge rtx → wtx * from I RWE , means rtx wtx . • wtx ∈ chain i .
By invoking Claim 19 for chain i and wtx , q has either (1) tail i wtx which, together with rtx → wtx * (from I RWE ) and wtx * tail i (Claim 18), means rtx wtx . Or else q has (2) wtx wtx (wtx has a path to every transaction in chain i , and wtx ∈ chain i ).
By topologically sorting q, we get a serial scheduleŝ. Next, we prove h matchesŝ, hence h is serializable (Definition 1).
Since h andŝ have the same set of transactions (because q has the same transactions as the known graph of Q(h), and thus also the same as h), we need to prove only that for every read that reads from a write in h, the write is the most recent write to that read inŝ.
First, for every pair of transactions (wtx, rtx) such that rtx reads a key k from wtx in h, q has an edge wtx → rtx (added to the known graph in line 15); thus rtx appears after wtx in s (a topological sort of q). Second, by invoking Claim 20 for (wtx, rtx), any other transaction writing to k is either "topologically prior" to wtx or "topologically subsequent" to rtx. This ensures that, the most recent write of rtx's read (to k) belongs to wtx inŝ, hence rtx reads the value of k written by wtx inŝ as it does in h. This completes the proof.
B Garbage collection correctness proof B.1 Verification in rounds
Besides the "one-shot verification" described in §3 and Appendix A, also works for online verification and does verification in rounds (pseudocode is described in Figure 12 ). In each round, 's verifier checks serializability on the transactions that have been received. In the following, we define terms used in the context of verification in rounds: complete history, continuation, strong session serializable, and extended history.
Complete history and continuation.
A complete history is a prerequisite of checking serializability. If a history is incomplete and some of the transactions are unknown, it is impossible to decide whether this history is serializable.
Definition 21 (Complete history). A complete history is a history where all read operations read from the write operations in the same history.
For verification in rounds, in each round, 's verifier receives a set of transactions that may read from the transactions in prior rounds. We call such newly coming transactions a continuation [68] .
Definition 22 (Continuation). A continuation r of a complete history h is a set of transactions in which all the read operations read from transactions in either h or r.
We denote the combination of a complete history h and its continuation r as h•r. By Definition 21, h•r is also a complete history. Also, we call the transactions in future continuations of the current history as future transactions.
In the following discussion, we assume that the transactions received in each round are continuations of the known history. However, in practice, the received transactions may not form a complete history and 's verifier has to adopt a preprocessing phase to filter out the transactions whose predecessors are unknown and save them for future rounds (for simplicity, such preprocessing is omitted in Figure 12 which should have happen in line 7.)
Strong session serializable.
As mentioned in §4.2, transactions' serialization order in practice should respect their causality which, in our context, is the transaction issuing order by clients (or session). So, if a history satisfies serializability (Definition 1) and the corresponding serial schedule preserves the transaction issuing order, we say this history is strong session serializable, defined below.
Definition 23 (Strong session serializable history).
A strong session serializable history is a history that matches a serial scheduleŝ, such thatŝ preserves the transaction issuing order for any client.
Notice that requires that each client is singlethreaded and blocking ( §2). So, for one client, its transaction issuing order is the order seen by the corresponding history collector (one client connects to one collector). The verifier also knows such order by referring to the history fragments.
Extended history. In the following, we define a helper notion extended history that contains the information of a history that has parsed by 's algorithm. An extended history e of a history h is a tuple (g, readfrom, wwpairs) generated by C K G in Figure 12 , line 9. Notice that in 's algorithm each round reuses the extended history e = (g, readfrom, wwpairs) from the preceding round. In the following, we use E(e, h) to represent C K G (g, readfrom, wwpairs, h). And, we use E(h) as a shortened form of E(∅, h).
Fact 24.
For a complete history h and its continuation r, E(h • r) = E(E(h), r). Because readfrom and wwpairs only depend on the information carried by each transaction, and this information is the same no matter whether processing h and r together or separately. For client ordering edges (Figure 12 , line [29] [30] [31] [32] , since they are the ordering of transactions seen by the collectors, the edges remain the same as well.
Definition 25 (Deletion from an extended history). A deletion of a transaction tx i from an extended history E(h) is to (1) delete the vertex tx i and edges containing tx i from the known graph g in E(h); and (2) delete tuples that include tx i from readfrom and wwpairs.
We use E(h) tx i to denote deleting tx i from extended history E(h).
B.2 Polygraph, polygraph, pruned polygraph, and pruned polygraph
Notice that an extended history contains all information from a history. So, instead of building from a history, both polygraph ( §2.3) and polygraph (Definition 2) can be built from an extended history.
Specifically, constructing a polygraph (V, E, C) from an extended history E(h) works as follows (which is similar to what is in §2.3):
• V are all vertices in E(h).g.
− −− → tx j , for some x.
We denote the polygraph generated from extended history E(h) as P(E(h)).
Since constructing an extended history is part of 's algorithm, it is natural to construct a polygraph from an extended history, which works as follow: assign 1: procedure V polygraph's known graph to be E(h).g and generate constraints by invoking G C (E(h).g, E(h).readfrom, E(h).wwpairs).
We denote the polygraph generated from extended history E(h) as Q(E(h)).
In order to test strong session serializability, we add cliens' transaction issuing order to polygraph and polygraph by inserting edges for transactions that are issued by the same client. We call such edges client ordering edges (short as COedges). For each client, these CO-edges point from one transaction to its immediate next transaction (Figure 12 , line [29] [30] [31] [32] .
Lemma 26. For a serializable history h, a serial schedule that h matches is some topological sort of an acyclic graph that is compatible with the polygraph without CO-edges (and polygraph without CO-edges) of h; and topological sorting an acyclic graph that is compatible with the polygraph without CO-edges (and polygraph without COedges) of h results in a serial schedules that h matches.
Proof. First, we prove the Lemma for polygraph (then later polygraph). In Papadimitriou's proof [93] ( §3, Lemma 2), when proving that h is serializable ⇒ polygraph is acyclic, the proof constructs an acyclic compatible graph according to a serial schedule, which means that this serial schedule is a topological sort of the constructed comptible graph. On the other hand, when proving that polygraph is acyclic ⇒ h is serializable, the proof gets the serial schedule from topological sorting an ayclic compatible graph.
Similarly, for polygraph, in Thoerem 12 (Appendix A), the proof constructs an acyclic compatible graph from a serial schedule; and in Thoerem 17, the proof topologically sorts an acyclic compatible graph to generate a serial schedule.
In the following, all polygraphs P(E(h)) and polygraphs Q(E(h)) include client ordering edges by default.
Lemma 27. Given a complete history h and its extended history E(h), the following logical expressions are equivalent:
(1) history h is strong session serializable.
(2) polygraph P(E(h)) is acyclic. (3) polygraph Q(E(h)) is acyclic.
Proof. First, we prove that (1) ⇐⇒ (2).
(1) =⇒ (2): Because h is strong session serializable, there exists a serial scheduleŝ that h matches and preserves the transaction issuing order of clients. By Lemma 26,ŝ is one of the topological sorts of some graphĝ that is compatible with the polygraph without client ordering edges. By adding client ordering edges toĝ, we getĝ+. Graphĝ+ is still compatible with P(E(h)), because edges ofĝ+ are a subset of the total ordering ofŝ (ŝ preserves the clients' transaction issuing order). Thus,ĝ+ is acyclic, hence P(E(h)) is also acyclic.
(2) =⇒ (1): Because polygraph P(E(h)) is acyclic, there exists a compatible graphĝ+ that is acyclic. By removing all the client ordering edges fromĝ+, we haveĝ which is compatible with the polygraph without client ordering edges. Becauseĝ has the same nodes but less edges thanĝ+, a topological sortŝ ofĝ+ is also a topological sort ofĝ. By Lemma 26, s is a serial schedule that h matches. Becauseĝ+ has client ordering edges,ŝ preserves transaction issuing order of clients, hence h is strong session serializable.
Similarly, we can prove (1) ⇐⇒ (3) by replacing polygraph (with and without client ordering edges) with polygraph (with and without client ordering edges).
Pruned (
) polygraph. Given a polygraph Q(E(h)) = (g, con), we call the polygraph after invoking P (con, g) (Figure 3 , line 75) as a pruned polygraph, denoted as Q p (E(h)). Similarly, if we treat a constraint in a polygraph (for example tx i → tx j , tx j → tx k ) as a constraint in polygraph but with each edge set having only one edge ( {tx i → tx j }, {tx j → tx k } ), then we can apply P to a polygraph P(E(h)) and get a pruned polygraph, denoted as P p (E(h)).
Note that Q(E(h)) and Q p (E(h)) are what 's algorithm actually creates; P(E(h)) and P p (E(h)) are helper notions for the proof only-they are not actually materialized.
Proof. First, we prove Q(E(h)) is acyclic ⇐⇒ Q p (E(h)) is acyclic.
"⇒". To begin with, we prove that pruning one constraint A, B from Q(E(h)) does not affect the acyclicity of the remaining polygraph. If so, pruning multiple constraints on an acyclic polygraph still results in an acyclicpolygraph. Now, consider the constraint A, B (A and B are edge sets) that has been pruned in Q(E(h)), and assume it gets pruned because of an edge (tx i , tx j ) ∈ A such that tx j tx i in the known graph.
Because Q(E(h)) is acyclic, there exists a compatible graphĝ that is acyclic. For the binary choice of A, B ,ĝ must choose B; otherwiseĝ would have a cycle due to the edge (tx i , tx j ) in A and tx j tx i in the known graph. And, P (Figure 3 , line 78-84) does the same thing-add edges in B to Q p (E(h))'s known graph, when the algorithm detects edges in A conflict with the known graph. Hence,ĝ is compatible with Q p (E(h)) and Q p (E(h)) is acyclic.
"⇐". Because Q p (E(h)) is acyclic, there exists a compatible graphĝ that is acyclic. Consider all constraints in Q(E(h)): for the pruned constraints,ĝ contains edges from one of the two edge sets in the constraint; for those constraints that is not pruned, Q p (E(h)) has them andĝ selects one edge set from each of them (ĝ is compatible with Q p (E(h))). Thus,ĝ contains one edge set from all constraints in Q(E(h)), so it is compatible with Q(E(h)). Plus,ĝ is acyclic, hence Q(E(h)) is acyclic. Now we prove that P(E(h)) is acyclic ⇔ P p (E(h)) is acyclic. Because the constraint in a polygraph is a specialization of the constraint in a polygraph (each edge set only contains one edge), the above argument is still true by replacing Q(E(h)), Q p (E(h)) to P(E(h)), P p (E(h)) respectively.
Lemma 29. Given a history that is strong session serializable, for any two transactions tx i and tx j , tx i tx j in the known graph of P p (E(h)) ⇐⇒ tx i tx j in the known graph of Q p (E(h))
Proof. Because h is not easily rejectable, E(h)'s known graph is acyclic and both P p (E(h)) and Q p (E(h))'s known graphs contain edges in E(h)'s known graph.
"⇒". We prove that for any edge tx a → tx b in path tx i tx j of P p (E(h)) (tx a might be tx i and tx b might be tx j ), there always exists tx a tx b in Q p (E(h)). In P p (E(h)) and Q p (E(h))'s known graph, there are four types of edges. Three of themreading-from edges (Figure 12, line 21) , anti-dependency edge (Figure 3, line 58) , and client order edges (Figure 12 , line 32)-are captured by E(h)'s known graph which shared by both P p (E(h)) and Q p (E(h)). Hence, if P p (E(h))'s known graph has tx a → tx b , Q p (E(h)) also has it.
Next, we prove that when edge tx a → tx b is the last type: edges added by P (Figure 3 , line 80,83) in P p (E(h)), Qp(E(h))'s known graph also has tx a tx b . Consider a constraint in P p (E(h)) is tx r → tx w2 , tx w2 → tx w1 where tx w1 and tx w2 writes to the same key; tx r reads this key from tx w1 . For tx w1 and tx w2 in Q p (E(h)), because they write the same key, they are either (1) in the same chain, or else (2) tx w2 and tx w2 belong to two chains and there is a constraint about these two chains.
Given tx a → tx b is added by pruning a constraint in P p (E(h)), there are two possibilities:
• tx a → tx b is tx r → tx w2 , which means tx w1 tx w2 (otherwise, the constraint would not be pruned). In Q p (E(h)), for above case (1), because tx w1 tx w2 , tx r reading from tx w1 has paths to the successive transactions (including tx w2 ) in the chain; for (2), because tx w1 tx w2 , this constraint would be pruned and tx r tx w2 . • tx a → tx b is tx w2 → tx w1 , which means tx w2 tx r . In Q p (E(h)), for (1), tx w2 must appear earlier than tx w1 in the chain (hence tx w2 tx r ), because otherwise tx r tx w2 , a contradiction; for (2), because tx w2 tx r , the tail of chain that tx w2 is in has a path to the head of tx w1 's chain, hence tx w2 tx w1 in Q p (E(h)).
"⇐". Similarly, by swapping P p (E(h)) and Q p (E(h)) in the above argument, we need to prove that given a pruned constraint A, B in Q p (E(h)) which contains tx a → tx b , there exists tx a tx b in P p (E(h)).
Again, for a constraint A, B about two chains chain i and chain j in Q p (E(h)) (head i /tail i is the head/tail of chain i ; rtx i is a read transaction reads from tail i ). There are two possibilities:
• tx a → tx b is rtx i → head j , which means head i tail j . Consider the constraint rtx i → head j , head j → tail i in P p (E(h)). Given that h is serializable, two chains must be schedule sequentially and cannot overlap, hence tail i head j . Then, this constraint in P p (E(h)) would be pruned and there is an edge rtx i → head j .
• tx a → tx b is tail i → head j , which means head i tail j . Call the second last transaction in chain i tx k . Consider the constraint tail i → head j , head j → tx k (tail i reads from tx k ). Again, because h is serializable, two chains cannot overlap, and tx k head j . Thus, the constraint is pruned and P p (E(h)) has tail i → head j .
(Extended) easily rejectable history. Given that a polygraph Q(E(h)) and a pruned polygraph Q p (E(h)) are equivalent in acyclicity, we extend the definition of an easily rejectable history (Definition 6) to use Q p (E(h)) which rules out more local malformations that are not strong session serializable.
Definition 30 (An easily rejectable history). An easily rejectable history h is a history that either (1) contains a transaction that has multiple successive writes on one key, or (2) has a cyclic known graph g in Q p (E(h)).
Corollary 31.
rejects (extended) easily rejectable histories.
Proof. By Lemma 7, rejects a history when (1) it contains a transaction that has multiple successive writes one one key; (2) If the known graph has a cycle in the known graph of Q p (E(h)), detects and rejects this history when checking acyclicity in the constraint solver.
B.3 Poly-strongly connected component
In this section, we define poly-strongly connected components (short as P-SCC) which capture the possible cycles that are generated from constraints. Intuitively, if two transactions appears in one P-SCC, it is possible (but not certian) there are cycles between them; but if these two transactions do not belong to the same P-SCC, it is impossible to have a cycle including both transactions.
Definition 32 (Poly-strongly connected component). Given a history h and its pruned polygraph Q p (E(h)), the poly-strongly connected components are the strongly connected components of a directed graph that is the known graph with all edges in the constraints added to it. Lemma 33. In a history h that is not easily rejectable, for any two transactions tx i and tx j writing the same key, if tx i tx j and tx j tx i in the known graph of Q p (E(h)), then tx i and tx j are in the same P-SCC.
Proof. By Claim 8, each of tx i and tx j appears and only appears in one chain (say chain i and chain j respectively). Because tx i tx j and tx j tx i , chain i = chain j . 's algorithm generates a constraint for every pair of chains on the same key (Figure 3, line 39) , so there is a constraint A, B for chain i and chain j , which includes tx i and tx j .
Consider this constraint A, B . One of the two edge sets (A and B) contains edges that establish a path from the tail of chain i to the head of chain j -either a direct edge (Figure 3 , line 67), or through a read transaction that reads from the tail of chain i (Figure 3, line 72) . Similarly, the other edge set establishes a path from the tail of chain j to the head of chain i . In addition, by Lemma 11, in each chain, there is a path from its head to its tail through the reading-from edges in the known graph (Figure 3, line 15 ). Thus, there is a cycle involving all transactions of these two chains. By Definition 32, all the transactions in these two chains-including tx i and tx j -are in one P-SCC.
B.4 Fence transaction, epoch, obsolete transaction, and frozen transaction
The challenge of garbage collecting transactions is that strong session serializability does not respect real-time ordering across clients and it is unclear to the verifier which transactions can be safely deleted from the history ( §4.1). uses fence transactions and epochs which generate obsolete transactions and frozen transactions that address this challenge. Given that h is not easily rejectable, by Definition 30, there is no cycle in the known graph. Hence, if we start from any Wfence and repeatedly find the predecessor of current Wfence on the epoch key (the predecessor is known because Wfences also read the epoch key), we will eventually reach the initial transaction (because the number of write fence transactions in h is finite). Thus, all Wfences and the initial transaction are connected and form a tree (the root is the initial transaction). Also, because h is not easily rejectable, no write transaction has two successive writes on the same key. So there is no Wfence that has two children in this tree, which means that the tree is actually a list. And each node in this list reads the epoch key from its preceding node and all of them write the epoch key. By During epoch assigning process, the verifier keeps track of the largest epoch number that all clients have exceeded, denoted as epoch agree (Figure 12, line 78) . In other words, every client has issued at least one fence transaction that has epoch number ≥ epoch agree .
One clarifying fact is that the epoch assigned to each transaction by the verifier is not the value (an integer) of the epoch key which is generated by clients. The verifier doesn't need the help from clients to assign epochs.
In Frozen transaction. In this section, we define frozen transactions. A frozen transaction is a transaction that no future transaction can be scheduled prior to these transactions in any possible serial schedule. Intuitively, if a transaction is frozen, this transaction can never be involved in any cycles containing future transactions. Because both tx j and tx k write x and tx i reads from tx j , they form a constraint tx i → tx k , tx k → tx j . Since tx k is a successor of tx j , this constraint is pruned by P and tx i → tx k in P p (E(h • r)). Plus, by Claim 37, tx k has paths to any future transactions, hence so does tx i .
B.5 Removable transactions and solved constraints
In this section, we define removable transactions which are deleted from the extended history by 's algorithm (Figure 12, line 113 ). Solved constraint and unsolved constraint. As mentioned in §2.3, a constraint in a polygraph involves three transactions: two write transactions (tx w1 , tx w2 ) writing to the same key and one read transaction (tx r ) reading this key from tx w1 . And, this constraint ( tx r → tx w2 , tx w2 → tx w1 ) has two ordering options, either (1) tx w2 appears before both tx w1 and tx r in a serial schedule, or (2) tx w2 appears after them. We call a constraint as a solved constraint when the known graph has already captured one of the options. For those constraints that are not solved constraints, we call them unsolved constraints. Notice that both solved constraints and unsolved constraints are defined on polygraph (not polygraph).
Lemma 48. Given a history h and a removable transaction t in h, for any its continuation r that satisfies h • r is not easily rejectable, there is no unsolved constraint that includes both t and a future transaction in r.
Proof. Call a constraint tx r → tx w2 , tx w2 → tx w1 (tx w1 and tx w2 write to the same key x; tx r reads x from tx w1 ) where one of the three transactions is removable and another is a future transaction. In the following, by enumerating all combinations of possibilities, we prove such a constraint is always a solved constraint.
• The removable transaction is tx r .
Because tx r is removable, it is a frozen transaction. As a predecessor of tx r (tx r reads from tx w1 ), by Definition 38, tx w1 has epoch[≤ epoch agree − 2]. Hence, the last transaction tx w2 must be the future transaction. By Claim 37, both tx w1 and tx r have paths to future transactions including tx w2 . Thus, this constraint is a solved constraint. • The removable transaction is tx w1 .
Because tx r reads x from tx w1 , by Claim 44, tx r cannot be a future transaction. Hence, the future transaction must be tx w2 .
Because tx w1 has writes, by Definition 43, tx w1 is an obsolete transaction on key x. Plus tx r reads x from tx w1 , by Claim 42, tx r has paths to future transactions including tx w2 . Thus, this constraint is a solved constraint. • The removable transaction is tx w2 .
Because h is a complete history, it is impossible to have tx r ∈ h but the transaction it reads tx w1 ∈ r. Also, because there must be one future transaction (in r), tx r ∈ h∧tx w1 ∈ h is impossible. Hence, there are two possibilities:
• tx w1 ∈ r ∧ tx r ∈ r. By Claim 37, tx w2 has a path to future transactions including tx w1 and tx r . Hence, the constraint is a solved constraint. • tx w1 ∈ h ∧ tx r ∈ r. Now, consider the relative position of tx w1 and tx w2 . Because a future transaction tx r reads from tx w1 , by Claim 44, tx w1 is not a candidate to remove. Further, by Definition 45, tx w1 and tx w2 do not belong to the same P-SCC. Hence, by Lemma 33, either tx w1 tx w2 or tx w2 tx w1 . Assume tx w1 tx w2 . Because tx w2 a frozen transaction (tx w2 is removable), by Definition 38, tx w2 has epoch[epoch agree − 2] . Thus, by Corollary 40, tx w1 is an obsolete transaction on x, but it is read by a future transaction tx r , a contradiction to Claim 44. Above all, tx w2 tx w1 . And, by Claim 37, tx w2 tx r . Hence, this constraint is a solved constraint. Lemma 49. Given a history h that is not easily rejectable and a continuation r, for any transaction tx i that is removable, if the known graph of E(h • r) tx i is acyclic, then the known graph of E(h • r) is acyclic.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that the known graph of E(h • r) has a cycle. Because h is not easily rejectable, there is no cycle in the known graph of E(h), hence the cycle must include at least one transaction (say tx j ) in r. Also, this cycle must include tx i , otherwise E(h • r) tx i is not acyclic. Now, consider the path tx j tx i in the cycle. If such path has multiple edges, say tx j tx k → tx i , then because tx i is a frozen transaction, by Definition 38, transaction tx k has epoch[epoch agree − 2] . Hence, by Claim 37, tx k has a path to the future transaction tx j which generates a cycle in E(h•r) tx i , a contradiction.
On the other hand, assume the path is an edge tx j → tx i . There are four types of edges in the known graph, but tx j → tx i can be none of them. In particular,
• Edge tx j → tx i cannot be a reading-from edge (Figure 12 , line 21) because h is a complete history. • Edge tx j → tx i cannot be an anti-dependency edge (Figure 3, line 58) , in which case tx j has to read from a predecessor of tx i . By Corollary 40, the predecessor being read is an obsolete transaction, a contradiction to Claim 41. • Edge tx j → tx i cannot be a client order edge (Figure 12 , line 32), because there is at least one fence transaction issued after tx i in the same client. • Edge tx j → tx i cannot be an edge added by P (Figure 3, line 80,83) . Because, by Lemma 48, there is no unsolved constraint between tx i and tx j .
B.6 The main argument
Lemma 50. Given a history h and any continuation r that satisfies h • r is not easily rejectable, for any transaction tx i that is removable, E(E(h) tx i , r) ⇐⇒ E(h • r) tx i Proof. First, we prove E(E(h) tx i , r) ⇐⇒ E(E(h), r) tx i , which means that the final extended history remains the same no matter when 's algorithm deletes tx i -before or after processing r.
An extended history has three components: readfrom, wwpairs, and the known graph g. For readfrom, because tx i is removable, by Claim 44, no future transactions in r can read from it. So deleting tx i before or after processing r does not change the readfrom, and also no reading-from edges (from tx i to transactions in r) are added to the known graph ( Figure 12, line 21) . Similarly, for wwpairs, there is no read-modify-write transactions in r that read from tx i , hence wwpairs are the same in E(E(h) tx i , r) and E(E(h), r) tx i , and no edges are added during I RWE (Figure 3 , line 58). Also, because tx i has epoch[epoch agree − 2], there must be a fence transaction that comes after tx i from the same client, hence there is no client order edge from tx i to transactions in r (Figure 12, line 32) . Thus, the known graphs in both extended historys are also the same.
Finally, by lemma 24, E(E(h), r) tx i ⇐⇒ E(h • r) tx i . Lemma 51. In a history that is strong session serializable, for any unsolved constraint tx r → tx w2 , tx w2 → tx w1 that includes a removable transaction in P p (E(h)), all three transactions (tx w1 , tx w2 , and tx r ) are in the same P-SCC.
Proof. Consider the relative position of tx w1 and tx w2 in the known graph of P p (E(h)).
• Assume tx w2 tx w1 . Because of tx w1 → tx r (tx r reads from tx w1 ), tx w2 tx r . By Definition 46, the constraint is a solved constraint, a contradiction. • Assume tx w1 tx w2 . By P (Figure 3 , line 80,83), tx r tx w2 . Again, by Definition 46, the constraint is a solved constraint, a contradiction. • Finally, tx w1 tx w2 and tx w2 tx w1 . By Lemma 29, tx w1 and tx w2 are concurrent in the known graph of Q p (E(h)) too. Thus, by Lemma 33, they are in the same P-SCC. Theorem 52. Given a history h that is strong session serializable and a continuation r, for any transaction tx i that is removable, there is:
Proof. First, we prove that if h • r is easily rejectable, rejects (so that neither P(E(h • r) tx i ) nor P(E(h • r)) is acyclic). By Definition 6, h • r either (1) contains a write transaction having multiple successive writes, or else (2) has cycles in the known graph of E(h • r).
For (1), if the write transaction which has multiple successive writes is tx i , given that h is strong session serializable, there is at least one successive write is in r. However, tx i is an obsolete transaction, hence the algorithm detects a violation in E(h • r) tx i (Claim 44). On the other hand, if the write transaction is not tx i , such transaction is detected in E(h • r) tx i the same way as in E(h • r). For (2), by Lemma 49, E(h • r) tx i also has cycles which the algorithm will reject. Now, we consider the case when h • r is not easily rejectable. Because h • r is not easily rejectable, there is no cycles in the known graph of P p (E(h • r)). In P p (E(h • r)), by Lemma 51, all transactions in unsolved constraints that involves tx i are in the same P-SCC (call this P-SCC pscc i ). Because tx i in pscc i is removable, by Definition 45, all transactions in pscc i are removable. Hence, no transaction in pscc i is involved in unsolved constraints with either future transactions in r (Lemma 48) or other transactions in h (Lemma 51). "⇒". Next, we prove that P p (E(h • r)) is acyclic by construction an acyclic compatible graphĝ. By Fact 47, we only need to concern unsolved constraints that might generate cycles. Consider the transactions in h • r but not in pscc i , the unsolved constraints are the same in both P p (E(h • r)) and P p (E(h•r) tx i ); given that P p (E(h•r) tx i ) is acyclic, there exists a combination of options for unsolved constraints that makesĝ acyclic in these transactions. Now, consider transactions in pscc i . Because all transactions in pscc i are in h and h is strong session serializable, there exists a combination of options for the unsolved constraints in pscc i so thatĝ has no cycle in pscc i . Finally, because there is no unsolved constraint between pscc i and other transactions in h • r (proved in the prior paragraph),ĝ is acyclic. "⇐". Because P(E(h • r)) is acyclic, there exists an acyclic compatible graphĝ. We can construct a compatible graphĝ for P(E(h • r) tx i ) by choosing all constraints according toĝ-choose the edges in constraints that appear inĝ. Given that the known graph in P(E(h • r) tx i ) is a subgraph of P(E(h • r))'s,ĝ is a subgraph ofĝ. Hence,ĝ is acyclic, and P(E(h • r) tx i ) is acyclic.
In the following, we use h i to represent the transactions fetched in i th round. The first round's history h 1 is a complete history itself; for the i th round (i ≥ 2), h i is a continuation of the prior history h 1 • · · · • h i−1 . We also use d i to denote the transactions deleted in the i th round.
Lemma 53. Given that history h 1 • · · · • h i • h i+1 is not easily rejectable, if a transaction is removable in h 1 • · · · • h i , then it remains removable in h 1 • · · · • h i • h i+1 .
Proof. Call this removable transaction tx i and the P-SCC it is in during round i as pscc i . Because 's algorithm does not delete fence transactions (Figure 12 , line 113), the epoch numbers for normal transactions in round i remain the same in round i + 1. Hence, the epoch agree in round i + 1 is greater than or equal to the one in round i. Thus, if 's algorithm (S F and G F ) sets a transaction (for example tx i ) as a candidate to remove in round i, it still is in round i + 1.
Because history h 1 • · · · • h i • h i+1 is not easily rejectable, transactions in pscc i do not have cycles with transactions in h i+1 . Also, by Lemma 51, transactions in pscc i do not have unsolved constraints with h i+1 . Thus, pscc i remains to be a P-SCC in round i + 1. Above all, by Definition 45, tx i is removable in round i + 1.
Theorem 54.
's algorithm runs for n rounds and doesn't reject ⇐⇒ history h 1 • h 2 · · · • h n is strong session serializable.
Proof. We prove by induction.
For the first round, 's algorithm only gets history h 1 (line 7) and constructs its extended history E(h 1 ) (line 9). Because V S doesn't reject, the prunedpolygraph Q p (E(h 1 )) is acyclic, and Q p (E(h 1 )) is acyclic ⇐⇒ Q(E(h 1 )) is acyclic [Lemma 28]
⇐⇒ h 1 is strong session serializable [Lemma 27]
For round i, assume that history h 1 • h 2 · · · • h i−1 is strong session serializable and 's algorithm doesn't reject for the last i−1 rounds. In round i, ' algorithm first fetches h i , gets the extended history from the last round which is E(h 1 • · · · • h i−1 ) (d 0 ∪ · · · ∪ d i−1 ), and constructs a pruned polygraph Q p (E(E(h 1 •· · ·•h i−1 ) (d 0 ∪· · ·∪ d i−1 ), h i )). In the following, we prove that 's algorithm doesn't reject (the pruned polygraph is acyclic) if and only if h1 • · · · • h i is strong session serializable. Q p (E(E(h 1 • · · · • h i−1 ) (d 0 ∪ · · · ∪ d i−1 ), h i )) is acyclic ⇐⇒ Q p (E(h 1 • · · · • h i ) (d 0 ∪ · · · ∪ d i−1 )) is acyclic [ Lemma 50, 53] ⇐⇒ P p (E(h 1 • · · · • h i ) (d 0 ∪ · · · ∪ d i−1 )) is acyclic [ Lemma 28, 27] ⇐⇒ P p (E(h 1 • · · · • h i )) is acyclic [Theorem 52, Lemma 53]
⇐⇒ P(E(h 1 • · · · • h i )) is acyclic [Lemma 28]
⇐⇒ h 1 • · · · • h i is strong session serializable [ Lemma 27] 
